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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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PERSPECTIVES ON EUROPEAN DEFENSE POLICY

European Defense

Paris POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE in French Spring 81 pp 53-64

[Debate between Georges Buis, reserve general, writer and journalist; author, among other publications, of "La Grotte" [The Grotto], Juilliard, 1961; "La Barque" [The Boat], Grasset, 1968; "Les fanfares perdues" [The Lost Fanfares], Le Seuil, 1974; "Vie et mort des Francais: 1939-1945" [Life and Death of the French People: 1939-1945] (in collaboration), Hachette, 1970, and Francois de Rose, ambassador of France, former member of the Atomic Energy Committee, representative on the Council for European Nuclear Research Organization, department head for Atomic and Space Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, assistant to the National Defense chief of staff and France's permanent representative on the Atlantic Council (1970-1975), author, among other publications, of "La France et la Defense de l'Europe" [France and the Defense of Europe], Le Seuil, 1976]

[Text] [Question] In your opinion, it is possible to speak of a weakening of the nuclear commitment by the United States with regard to Western Europe? What signs seem to justify this point of view in your mind?

Georges Buis: First of all, the various components of the American nuclear commitment with regard to Western Europe must be individualized.

Concerning tactical nuclear weapons, the decrease in the number of American ANT [tactical nuclear weapon]--they say, 1,000--is unimportant. What counts--with the understanding that insofar as I am concerned this kind of approach to the issue is purely theoretical--is for the remaining 6,000 warheads and their launchers to be superior in quality to their predecessors. The operation seems to be underway. Therefore, we must speak of strengthening and not of weakening in this field. This result runs the risk, nonetheless, of being annihilated by preemption in the use of anti-ANT nuclear weapons, which have, apparently, become the attribute of the Soviets.

With regard to Euromissiles, their scheduled appearance fills a gap and cannot help strengthening the impression of an American commitment. Just as in the case of the ANT, the possibilities of preemptive action by the USSR must, however, be taken into account in practice.

In the area of strategic nuclear warfare, it is undeniable that a number of European countries are linking up slowly, reluctantly but irresistibly, with the French point

of view based on the notion of sanctuary: the Americans will not risk "desanctuarisation" of their territory, even in order to safeguard their dearest ally. Henry Kissinger's statements, in September 1979, in Brussels, produced the effect of a cold shower on the warmest believers in the Atlantic Alliance. In fact, those statements amounted to saying: "Do not ask us for strategic guarantees ... that might lead to the destruction of civilization." The implication was that what is involved there is an apocalypse the risk of which is taken--if worst comes to worst--only for oneself and that can be avoided only by assuring the other decider that this inviolable egoism will be adhered to. Later, several American senators stated that it was unthinkable to risk the destruction of a large city in the United States to turn the Soviets away from their designs on Berlin. If this attitude seems to be justified for Berlin, why would it not be justified for Frankfurt or Wiesbaden? Now, deterrence rests on a formal threat to use strategic nuclear weapons. With regard to Europe, the only significant deterrence is, just as in the times of the SAC*, the threat to use the weapons of the American central systems against the territory of the USSR. Fifteen and more years ago, France wrote off this possibility, followed along this path by the other European countries. The American strategic nuclear commitment, therefore, is to be entered under the heading of "losses" on the balance sheet.

Francois de Rose: You are right in speaking of an American nuclear "commitment" with regard to Europe and not of an American "guarantee." The word "guarantee" is used very often, incorrectly, especially in France. When Henry Kissinger stated, in Brussels, that in case of aggression the Europeans should not count on the United States to destroy hundreds of Soviet cities at the risk of undergoing comparable destruction in the United States, there was a great outcry. Nevertheless, he was merely expressing an obvious fact. The United States has never given a "guarantee" to pulverize the USSR if Europe should be attacked, not even if the United States were itself at a lower level.

Fortunately, moreover. Because this kind of attitude would not have been credible. Now then, credibility is a basic component of deterrence. The United States said and still says that maintenance of the freedom and integrity of Europe represent, for it, a vital interest and that they will strive with every means to preserve them. Consequently, we should stop confusing deterrence with antidegraphic operations, stop taking the part for the whole and the foundations of the structure for its whole architecture.

Having said that, it is true that Soviet progress has caused the disappearance of the qualitative superiority and, in some cases, quantitative, of the United States in the nuclear field. The result is that Moscow has a first strike capability against Europe and America that makes "control of escalation" on which the NATO defense doctrine is based much more aleatory and raises in new, more complex terms the coupling between the theater weapons and the strategic weapons of the United States.

[Question] Is the recent decision by NATO aiming at installing Pershing II and cruise missiles on European territory an adequate response to the threat that the

* Strategic Air Command, which held the absolute privilege of striking Soviet territory until Sputnik's "beep."

Soviet SS-20's are bringing to bear on the old continent? More generally, do you think that the installation of those medium-range missiles on the soil of old Europe is of such a nature as to accentuate the "coupling" between American theater weapons and strategic weapons?

Georges Buis: Deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe is, without a doubt, an adequate response (still theoretically) to the deployment of SS-20's. It expresses, at the very least, a willingness to do something. This is not negligible. For my part, I do not assign any other value to it.

On the other hand, it can be viewed that Euromissiles represent an additional rung on the escalation ladder and that, in this respect, their deployment accentuates decoupling between the American theater weapons and central systems.

Francois de Rose: Strictly speaking, it is not a response. There can be no question of a real attempt to neutralize the SS-20's, insofar as they have a mobility and an action radius making it possible to deploy them out of range of the Pershing II and the cruise missiles. The role of the missiles that NATO has decided to install is very exactly, as you suggest, to ensure coupling between the American theater forces and strategic weapons.

In fact, the main characteristic of these weapons is the ability to reach the western regions of the USSR, approximately up to Moscow. The result is that, if a conflict should begin in Europe, it would probably not be limited only to the territory of the western countries and of the USSR satellites, but would also involve Soviet territory itself. Consequently, the Soviet command would have to choose between two equally difficult options: either counter on American territory and unleash the strategic system of the United States--that is to say, enter into the unknown, on the ladder of violence--or else refrain from that kind of response and, consequently, recognize the immunity, the sanctuarization of the United States, while the Soviet Union would be "desanctuarized." This would be absurd. Therefore, the role of those missiles is primarily to confront Moscow with that kind of dilemma. It is interesting, in this connection, to note that, in most cases, the territorial continuity between Europe and Russia on the one hand and the gap of the ocean between Europe and America on the other hand work to the detriment of the West. Deployment of medium-range missiles in Western Europe creates the only important case in which those two factors work to our advantage and to the detriment of Moscow. Hence, Brezhnev's frantic efforts to induce the Europeans to renounce them.

[Question] Does it seem desirable to you to set up a purely European "deterrent"? Is it feasible (technically, economically, legally, politically)? What would be the "nucleus" on the basis of which that kind of idea might take shape (Franco-British cooperation? Franco-German cooperation?)? In any case, do you not think that participation of the FRG in an authentically European nuclear force is filled with insurmountable difficulties?

Georges Buis: Production, total mastery, deployment of a purely European "deterrent" is, obviously, eminently desirable.

Technically and economically, this "deterrent" is feasible. Legally, it is essentially not feasible, that is to say for the nuclear weapon itself. Politically, it is not at all feasible. Of course, the whole environment of the weapon system

(satellite, satellite launcher, various sophisticated technologies) may be common to the Europeans both politically and technically. But this is not true of the weapon strictly speaking, of threat maneuvers and still less of a decision to use it.

If we abide by a "Cafe du Commerce" logic, the basic nucleus making it possible to achieve both Europe and the nuclear deterrent should consist of France and Great Britain, both already--and for the last two decades--nuclear powers. This issue has been raised for the last 15 years. And for the last 15 years England has always opposed it with a total, complete, blunt "no." Thus, it seems that, on occasion of her trip to the United States, Thatcher concluded a contract pertaining the purchase of American missile-launching submarines of the Trident type. She chose, just as MacMillan did not long ago with the Polaris submarines, America and the double key. Worse yet, she did that at a time when the production of excellent missiles in France is no longer in the promise stage but, rather, in the reality stage. With regard to Franco-German cooperation, it would associate two very complementary countries, both continental, and forming, united, the framework of the continent. If prejudices like "we must mistrust eternal Germany" are rejected, if we stop banishing Germany insidiously from Europe (for how many centuries?) and if we agree that this attitude is incompatible not only with the defense of Europe but also with the European unity that everyone claims to be praying for, only the political obstacle is left. It is sizable. But is it believed that De Gaulle opened his arms to Adenauer so that the Franco-German reconciliation would give birth, as it has done, only to the Franco-German Youth Commission? Is it straining the thinking of two illustrious deceased to believe that they wanted to go farther, very far in the union of their two countries and thus give Europe a chance to remake itself around them? From this point of view, the political obstacle falls down and we can envisage (at least when nuclear weapons are included) the birth of a Franco-German federal state. A federation produces a head. With a head, that is to say one single high political authority, the whole range of nuclear weapons systems can be deployed.

But French minds are not ready for this. And the FRG is giving the Ostpolitik higher and higher priority.

Francois de Rose: I think that you understand by "European deterrence" a strategic nuclear armament and not a group of forces that can guarantee this deterrence at every level.

At any rate, regardless of your premise, my answer is equally negative. Not for technical reasons. Because France, with its resources alone, has provided itself with a respectable strategic force. The economic outlay entailed by this kind of choice is without doubt not beyond our country's reach. The legal or political obstacles are more considerable. But, in politics, possible and impossible have no eternity value. The fact that this kind of plan for a European strategic force cannot avail itself of some usefulness seems more essential to me. It is, in fact, difficult to see how that kind of tool could have an effective deterrent role.

Although its strategic force gives France the possibility of saying that in case of a threat on its territory it is capable of inflicting unacceptable damage on the enemy, this language can in no way be extended to all Europe. In order for this to be so, there would have to be a European government to which all the peoples

would have delegated the power of decision over their life or their death or France would have to give an irrevocable guarantee of intervention. The deterrent power of European strategic forces is actually limited only to the countries having them and sanctuarization of the territories is effective only for those countries and their approaches. This is satisfactory, but far from solving every problem.

In other words, deterrence is not only--not even, with all the more reason, above all--a question of volume of the strategic forces. Even with 15 missile-launching submarines, neither France nor any Franco-British or Franco-German pair could ensure deterrence in Europe, because the threat of use of those weapons in response to a violation of the borders of a European country would not be credible. It is not logical to say that an American "guarantee" is not credible and to talk as if it were possible to replace it with a European guarantee that would work in every circumstance. In talking like that, we risk no longer deterring anything at all.

These proposals are still more surprising when they emanate from advocates of independence, because that kind of "guarantee" would entail the end of any freedom of evaluation by our country with regard to the circumstances and conditions for its nuclear engagement.

European deterrence implies both a sovereign government of Europe and an unconditional guarantee by France or Great Britain.

[Question] Alexandre Sanguinetti formerly defended the point of view according to which departure of American troops stationed in Germany would be a saving stimulation to the Europeans. As long as American troops continue to be based on the old continent, he said, no purely European defense will be possible. Is that your feeling? In your opinion, would a substantial decrease in the number of those GI's harm Europe's security?

Georges Buis: I share Alexandre Sanguinetti's opinion entirely. Even the (American) "four men and a corporal" called for by Foch in 1919 would be too many for Europeans to be obliged:

1. To be.
2. To organize their defense,
or, of course--and many wish it secretly--to go to bed.

On the other hand, as long as the European countries are not thus confronted by this absolute, which would oblige them to act, any decrease (or increase) in the number of GI's--although neither a decrease nor an increase can change the tragic ambiguity of a "graduated defense" lost beforehand--far from being an incentive will only accentuate the weakness of their public opinions. I repeat: defense is an absolute. It is assumed completely or not at all.

Francois de Rose: Departure of the Americans would imply two things:

- a. The end of the presence of American nuclear weapons in Europe and, consequently, the end of the coupling between theater weapons and the weapons of the American central system, and, b, the end of the integrated military system of the Atlantic Alliance.

Because I am no fortuneteller, I do not know whether that would give rise to that burst of energy among the Europeans that would induce them abruptly to devote 8 to 10 percent of the gross national product to defense to bring about a perfect coordination of their armament production, of their employment concepts by a kind of "Night of 4 August of the interest of each for the greater good of all."

It is possible to believe this. In my opinion, I think, rather, that this withdrawal by the United States would give rise to a stampede within the Alliance and would trigger from the starting-gate of all the capitals of Europe a gigantic race to Moscow, a sort of "political FIGARO cross-country run" or international jogging toward the Kremlin. It can be imagined who would come in an easy first.

On the other hand, it seems to me that if the United States were to decrease its personnel in Europe slightly, in order to strengthen threatened theaters, the Europeans should in no case complain of abandonment.

The essential point is for the basis for an American engagement, almost certain in the assumption of a threat against the security of Europe, to continue to exist.

[Question] It is said sometimes that the political independence of Europe will continue to be a fiction or a topic of conversation as long as Europe is not provided with its own defense. Is that your opinion?

Georges Buis: Of course. The great powers are preserving tenaciously the soporific consisting of the old mobilizing reaction of 1949, which gave birth to NATO and, later (when bipolarity was something well established), to the Warsaw Pact (1954), so that Europe will not develop.

Francois de Rose: Which came first, the chicken or the egg? The truth is--regardless of how disagreeable it may be--that Europe lacks two the main attributes of the superpowers: space and resources. Consequently, it cannot be a superpower and, moreover, does not aspire to become one, as Giscard d'Estaing and Schmidt said in their joint press conference last July. Therefore, the question is, rather, to know what degree of political independence is desired by the European countries with regard to the superpowers. Whether it is a question of an independence enabling them to keep the balance equal between the declared enemy of our ideals and the 30-year-long ally, whether they do not tolerate that the price of their independence from Moscow will be recognition of common interests within the camp of freedom. This is the same as saying that they choose neutrality.

I do not believe that this will be their choice. After all, the issue is pointless, because it is hardly likely that the Europeans are ready to sacrifice their standard of living in the sole aim of achieving a balance with the power of the USSR.

As long as the world continues to be bipolar militarily, there will hardly be any chance of seeing Europe acquire this capability of self-defense.

Will it be more "independent" when China, after becoming a superpower, causes a tripolar world to emerge? Our children and grandchildren will be the judge of that.

[Question] What courses should be explored, in order to increase European solidarity in the military field? Should this imperative prevail over the need for strengthening trans-Atlantic solidarity?

Georges Buis: In my opinion, a strengthening of European solidarity depends on a distribution and coordination of tasks, as was true, for example, of the Ariane rocket, of the manufacture of the whole environment of nuclear weapons systems and of those systems themselves, with the exception, of course, of the nuclear warhead. Thus, Europe could, in a short period of time, be armed to defend itself, if it succeeds in existing.

Preeminence of trans-Atlantic solidarity would mean the certain death of this orientation, which you describe as an imperative.

Francois de Rose: First of all, things must be viewed as they are, that is to say it is necessary to have a good appreciation of the dangers in Europe and outside the area covered by the Atlantic Alliance.

In Europe, possible progress is undoubtedly limited. Neither France nor Great Britain can offer an attractive replacement of American assistance (regardless of whether or not we like it). Our neighbors on the continent, especially the Federal Republic of Germany, accept the leadership of the United States and its nuclear coverage (in spite of its gaps), because a superpower and a non-European superpower is involved. It would be impossible for another European country to gather that kind of assent both for psychological and for political and military reasons. And because Germany's participation in a nuclear effort presents the well-known difficulty and because Germany itself does not want it, there are hardly any other solutions in sight.

This does not mean that the Europeans are not completely wrong in not seeking to come up with a common point of view on the important problems concerning their security.

In its article 4, the Ottawa Declaration recognized the specific nature of the problems of defense of the old continent. Believe someone who had to deal with preparation of that declaration. It is not the result of chance. But it has remained a dead letter, instead of leading our governments to tackle their security problems in terms of that specificity. Therefore, nothing has come of it and France, which had proposed the idea and the Declaration project, has not drawn from it any policy on the scale of Europe. Not even with regard to the deployment of Euro-missiles.

Perhaps it would be possible for some stands and actions better coordinated in their inspiration and execution to intervene with regard to overseas problems. All means are not involved on the same basis. The Alliance cannot intervene as such. But the situation in the [Persian] Gulf concerns the Europeans (and the Japanese) at least as much--and without doubt more--as the Americans. The presence of French, British and American ships in that region of the world is, perhaps, an encouraging sign.

With regard to the matter of knowing whether there should be priority between European solidarity or Atlantic solidarity, it reminds me of the fact that not so long ago we criticized the Germans for being "the best students in the Atlantic class," while at present we are concerned over the developments of the Ostpolitik.

Because I do not believe in the possibility of ensuring Europe's security by its own means alone, a search for those priorities is like the discussion on the sex of angels. To tell the truth, there is a Western world and everything that strengthens some of its members strengthens the whole.

[Question] How would you define the contribution of the French deterrence force to the security of all Western Europe? What value do you assign to the concept of "expanded sanctuarization"?

Georges Buis: I shall reverse the order of the questions. "Expanded sanctuarization" is a crime against France when it is conceived as the decision to make operational use of the deterrent nuclear means with which it has equipped itself in the framework of a strategy of self-sufficiency, to the benefit of its allies and without a direct threat to its sanctuary (by that I mean, emphatically, that there is not "a single military space" in Europe).

If one thinks, and this is my opinion, that deterrence of the French sanctuary, by the very fact of its existence, is, in the second degree, a deterrence to the benefit of the other Europeans, then it is possible to talk about expanded deterrence.

France's nuclear weapons systems, which bring defense to the enemy's homeland, confront the enemy with an alternative. Either take a foolish risk to conquer the bit of Europe with which it has a common frontier and risk escalation for so small a "stake," or else, aiming at occupation of all Western Europe, clash with France and make a decision that no decision-maker has yet had to make in history: to tackle deliberately no longer theater actions, but rather the central systems of a national action.

What NATO country makes such a contribution today to the defense of the Western Europeans?

Francois de Rose: The existence of independent nuclear forces complicates the game of a possible aggressor by introducing some additional unknown factors in his calculation of probabilities. There is, therefore, a contribution to the overall "posture" of deterrence, as was also recognized in the already mentioned Ottawa Declaration.

The concept of "expanded sanctuarization" is useful insofar as it implies that sanctuarization is not limited to France alone. But no one has claimed that this expansion could cover all Europe.

In any case, the extent of the concept does not depend on the number of our strategic weapons. We have already said that, even though we might have 15 missile-launching submarines, our deterrence capability would not cover a larger area than with six or seven of those submarines. It might even be maintained that if our strategic force absorbed the greater part of our resources to the point of risking leaving out our battle corps, our Air Force and our capability of overseas action, we would be condemned to a de facto neutrality, which, far from expanding our deterrence, would reduce it. Fortunately, it does not seem that our government wants to commit itself to that course.

Choice: Disarmament, 'Sanctuary,' or Defense

Paris LE MONDE in French 21 May 81 p 2

[Article by Francois de Rose, ambassador of France: "The First Obligation"]

[Text] France's security rests on an assurance, defense of Europe by the Atlantic Alliance, and on a counterassurance, its strategic armament, which establishes a presumption of "sanctuarization" of its territory in case of defeat of NATO.

It would be just as foolish to neglect the assurance, counting only on the counter-assurance, as to make the opposite finesse. Militarily, there is no possible defense of Europe without the collaboration of France's forces and logistic position. Politically, there would be no independent France in a conquered Europe.

Thanks to statements or articles by Jospin, Hernu, Chevenement and Sarre, on the socialist side, we have learned that Mitterrand favored construction, during his 7-year term, of two missile-launching nuclear submarines beyond his predecessor's program. Because he probably favors putting a ceiling on our defense budget at its present level (about 4 percent of the gross domestic product), we must conclude that the expenditures thus undertaken will be compensated by savings under other headings. If these sacrifices were demanded of the battle corps, our capability of operating on our continent would, therefore, be jeopardized.

Lionel Jospin confirmed (POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE, No 10 [published in JPRS 77750 3 Apr 81 #1727]) that the new president was contemplating renegotiating the Washington treaty. We are taking the liberty of making a warning: that kind of move might result only in a refusal by our allies or in a breakup of the alliance.

With regard to the idea of a progressive, simultaneous dissolution of the military blocs, this could be only a bad deal, because the Warsaw Pact is only the unilateral crowning of the structure of bilateral agreements tying its satellites to the USSR.

The question of the generosity of this ideal, like the ideal of disarmament, is not involved. If account is taken of the heat inherent in any election campaign, we shall not insult the first secretary of the Socialist Party by believing that he does not think what he says, or either that he thinks it. We shall content ourselves with hoping that the realities of government authority will divert Mitterrand from moves that could only harm our international credit.

With J.-P. Chevenement (LE MONDE, 5 May), a less idealistic body of thinking is involved, closer to the problems and their solutions, although he does not convince us any more. He knows that the Atlantic Alliance exists and he stresses the importance of our possible logistic collaboration.

He takes it for granted that our air and naval forces would participate in operations of the allies. But he reserves the battle corps for the single role of support for our tactical nuclear weapon in its mission of final warning before the use of strategic means. In other words, France would wait, behind the protection of the West German barrier, for its allies to stop the enemy or, in case of failure, for a direct threat to its territory to produce the deterrence requirements.

It is fortunate that the United States and Great Britain do not have the same doctrine and are so kind as to occupy that protective barrier with the Germans and a few others. Otherwise, the concept advocated by Chevenement would not even have a reason for being.

But the substance of the debate is not there.

The question is to know whether provision for our possible participation in defense operations on the continent, alongside our allies, would deprive our country of its freedom of decision in case of a crisis.

We should point out, first of all, that our commitments with regard to our allies limit this freedom of evaluation as soon as we would be faced by an act of aggression in Europe against one of the signatories of the Brussels treaty, that is to say primarily the Federal Republic of Germany.

Our freedom pertains to the question of knowing whether or not the conflict involves our vital interests or our commitments or both and, in accordance with the Atlantic treaty, the methods of our contribution to common defense. Therefore, it must not be jeopardized by military execution arrangements. The three conditions required for its maintenance were stated officially by Raymond Barre. They are: point of no return in the integrated military system, nonoccupation of a gap along the frontier between the two alliances, nonobligation of putting our logistics in the service of NATO. Once these conditions have been met, all the rest is only a study of assumptions by the staffs. Refusal of these studies would be a condemnation to neutrality.

The question that must be answered is one of knowing whether we would be capable of preserving our independence if our allies were beaten. If the answer is negative, it would not be compatible with protection of that independence to seek only sanctuarization of our territory. If the answer is affirmative, what would we do in an alliance system whose political objective is based on the notion of community of fate?

Finally, we do not see in what way this sanctuarization would be jeopardized by our participation in allied operations in a position of general reserve, which seems to be the generally accepted assumption. Because, if things should turn out bad for the allies, it would always be possible for us to use our tactical weapons to denote our determination to proceed next, if necessary, to the use of strategic weapons.

The agreement concluded, immediately after our withdrawal from the integrated military organization, between General Ailleret, French chief of general staff, and General Lemnitzer, supreme commander in Europe, was concluded when the alliance had adopted the concept of graduated response to which France did not agree. Nevertheless, our government approved that document, which was to serve as a basis and framework for every subsequent agreement organizing participation by "French forces, especially in Germany, if article 5 were called into play, in joint military actions."

It is not possible to relate the "Gaulist doctrine," as Chevenement does, to the two single notions of deterrence and independence. They were supplemented by provisions providing for and organizing our participation in defense of the continent.

Deterrence in Europe

Moreover, deterrence is not based only on strategic nuclear weapons. It is assured by a group of forces that prevent the enemy from aiming at a limited conflict and at attaining his political objectives without recourse to conflict.

Insofar as France is concerned, the first stage in this deterrence, the one that offers most security with the least risk, is exercised by the alliance at every level. If our battle corps were withdrawn, would we still have a defense policy consistent with our interests of security and with our foreign policy?

Now is the time for recalling that the most explicit text on western solidarity signed since the Washington treaty—the 1974 Ottawa Declaration—originated in a project submitted by France under the presidency of Pompidou whose line of conduct is, at times, contrasted with the line of Giscard d'Estaing. Actually, the deceased president brought France's most open and most determined collaboration to an updating of the principles concerning the security of the entire alliance.

There is a great distance between this boldness and the prudence that a certain intellectual terrorism has been imposing in the last few years. Undoubtedly, this is the cause for our country's official silence on those Euromissiles whose installation will make an irreplaceable contribution to deterrence in Europe.

This issue, disregarded too long in France, is now going to the foreground of current events, because Chancellor Schmidt is threatening to resign, if his party backs down on acceptance of this deployment and because Jospin announces that it will appear on the agenda of talks between the Socialist Party and the Communist Party.

It did not seem clear whether the stand taken by Georges Sarre (LE MONDE for 17 April [published in JPRS 78501, 13 July 81, No 1782 pp 1-4]), favoring a freezing of the deployment of SS-20 missiles and noninstallation of Pershing 2 and cruise missiles, in accordance with the traditional positions of socialist parties on disarmament, reflects the personal views of Mitterrand.

But it is close to the moratorium proposed by Brezhnev and would risk embarrassing neighboring countries, which have to maintain a difficult decision in the face of joint pressure by Soviet diplomacy and pacifist, ecologist and religious movements.

If the decision on installation recently confirmed in Rome by the Atlantic Council were to be questioned, it would undoubtedly never be taken up again. Coupling between the European theater and the American strategic system would be finished, that is to say the king pin of deterrence. It would also mark Moscow's greatest political victory over the Westerners and would put in concrete form, once and for all, the right of the USSR to influence choices of weapons needed for the defense of Europe.

Because nothing is farther from reality than to believe that those Euromissiles would give the United States a first strike capability against the Soviet intercontinental missiles and would upset the balance between the great powers. In fact, the 108 Pershing missiles would be able to hit only four silo fields west of Moscow out of the 21 deployed all over Soviet territory. An American attack conducted with Euromissiles alone would, therefore, leave the large majority of the 1,398 Soviet missiles intact for a counterattack on American territory.

In order for an American first strike not to depend on a rash strategy, it would have to have all the warheads arrive at the same time on Soviet targets. This means that the Pershing 2 missiles, instead of leaving before the intercontinental missiles, would have to be fired, in order to serve the aggression that the Kremlin says it fears, from 20 to 25 minutes after the rockets are to cross the Atlantic.

As is known, the superiority of the Warsaw Pact in the traditional field is no longer compensated by an American superiority in tactical nuclear weapons. With regard to the principal problem of medium-range nuclear missiles, the progress made by the USSR will begin to be corrected only toward the middle of the decade. If, on the other hand, the United States alone is able to extend its deterrence capability on a worldwide scale, collaboration by European countries, therefore by France, will be necessary, both in our interest and in the interest of our allies and of the Third World, in protecting regions located outside the Atlantic zone.

Will our country choose to fall back on a policy based solely on sanctuarization of the territory, in other words neutrality? Will it choose disarmament and dissolution of alliances? Or will it decide to contribute to maintaining the security of the world to which, in its immense majority, it intends to continue to belong?

At a time when a socialist is taking over the supreme responsibilities in our country, it is advisable to remember that the first social obligation of a government with regard to the people who have placed trust in him is to ensure their security.

Euromissiles: Counterpoise to Pacifist Fears

Paris LE FIGARO in French 19 May 81 pp 1, 4

(Article by Alfred Fabre-Luce: "European Pacifism")

[Text] The presidential campaign prevented us from devoting all our attention to the recent Atlantic deliberations and to the opinion movements associated with them. An essential topic is involved, however, and the official optimism announced by NATO does not excuse us from examining a phenomenon that is developing rapidly: the progress of a new European pacifism.

I have just said new. There is, of course, some resemblance between the present movement and the one illustrated by Picasso's dove, in the 1950's. The difference is that today's international conditions are more complex. It is also true that there is, among the neopacifists, a little less ignorance of the reality of the USSR and a little more resignation to its preeminence.

Next week's elections in Holland are going to be an interesting test. A country is involved that presents two special characteristics. 1. It has been neutral for a long time. 2. A kind of spiritual conversion (or deconversion) has come about in some Christian circles. Because religious practice has been cut in half in the last 10 years, part of the moral forces that thus withdrew from the churches have moved into another "belief," expressed by this formula of a pastor, former secretary general of the largest church in the Netherlands: "The armies of God will be stronger than the armies of the enemy."

The intelligentsia of the left is tending to join in this optimism by another way. Christians and non-Christians are thus "sublimating" less honorable feelings: panic

in the face of prospects of an "apocalypse" and start of anticipated submission to the more threatening superpower, by means of transition of a Western Finlandization. This defeatism has not yet triumphed over the good sense of the people impregnated with the cruel lessons of the past. (Yesterday's neutrality did not save Holland from Nazi invasion.) A 1980 survey recorded only 15 percent "absolute pacifists," but the 26 May poll informs us more about this matter.

In Northern Europe, discussion is centered around one specific issue: Does the existence of nuclear weapons on a country's soil ward off or attract danger? In case of doubt, an ambiguous stand is taken, leaving military protection to other countries or to other parties and retaining the benefit of nuclear "innocence."

According to a recent survey, three-fourths of the Dutch think that their country should remain in NATO, but two-thirds of those same Dutch believe that it should reject any stationing of nuclear weapons on its territory.

All over Europe, the pacifist trend is stronger among the socialists than among the liberals. In Great Britain, the Laborites are opposed to any nuclear armament and an opinion poll condemning them on this point showed, nevertheless, that there was a majority hostile to the installation of American cruise missiles on British soil. In the Federal Republic of Germany, this debate is ravaging the SPD itself. Chancellor Schmidt was the first to pull the alarm bell when the Soviets trained SS-20 missiles on Western Europe, but this attitude is now earning him the hostility of a fraction of his party. Fear of a final agreement between Washington and Moscow to limit a possible nuclear war to Europe persists a bit everywhere and is inclining minds toward a rejection of Euromissiles. That is a misconception, because installation of those weapons would ensure, on the contrary, coupling of the two defenses (American and European).

Development of European pacifism is linked to a doubt on the extent of our deterrence. The traditional Gaullist policy is often presented as a game of "all or nothing," envisaging one single defense assumption: total strategic nuclear counterblow. Now, some of our better experts expressed the opinion recently that the threat of countering a border incident in Europe by the great nuclear play was not credible. Ambassador Francois de Rose believes that 15 missile-launching submarines would not ward off that danger any better than six or seven, because, in that kind of assumption, no submarine would be used. He writes: "The concept of 'expanded sanctuarization' is useful insofar as it implies that sanctuarization is not limited to France alone. But no one claims that this expansion could cover all of Europe." "The nuclear weapon is not an absolute weapon," General Valentin writes, for his part, in a recent book. Statements like these, regardless of how sensible they are, have one disadvantage: they encourage the USSR to think that it will be able to undertake certain military actions against Western Europe without exposing itself to a military reaction on our part.

It has been believed since 1950 that possible participation by Free Germany in a European nuclear force would be more dangerous than possession of the nuclear weapon by the USSR. This postulate, explainable by bad memories of the last war, has had important political consequences. The FRG, excluded from the "Atomic Club" and hardly able to count on French participation in a "forward area battle," has concluded that it should give increasingly higher priority to the Ostpolitik. General Buis states that in the last issue of the periodical POLITICAL INTERNATIONALE [see

related article published this JPRS report] and he adds: "If prejudices like 'we must mistrust eternal Germany' are rejected, if we stop banishing Germany insidiously from Europe (for how many centuries?) and if we agree that this attitude is incompatible not only with the defense of Europe but also with the European unity that everyone claims to be praying for, only the political obstacle is left. It is sizable." These last words are an understatement. It is very difficult to imagine, in the near future, the Franco-German union dreamed of still (timidly) by General Buis.

Has the problem become insoluble therefore? This can be feared, but we must never resign ourselves to the worst. The debate on Euromissiles offers Europe and the United States a historical opportunity to emphasize that a war started by the USSR on our continent might rapidly involve Soviet territory. This is real "deterrence." The efforts made by Brezhnev to ward off this threat are already revealing its effectiveness.

The development of European pacifism is creating a psychological situation that should be treated tactfully. If it is opposed too harshly, we would risk strengthening it and thus playing into the hands of the USSR. It is necessary, rather, to try to "reason" with it. The first move by a great-hearted man is to sympathize with those who believe that they can avoid a nuclear apocalypse by setting the example of disarmament. Those who hold this opinion believe--or pretend to believe--that they would give rise to a contagion that would soon spread to the Soviet world. Now, in the present-day USSR, pacifism cannot be expressed materially. Deep down within them, most pacifists know this. Therefore, the Dutch press gives almost no news on the USSR. This news would be apt to disturb the tranquility of its readers.

In order to be understood by European opinion, it is necessary to maintain contact and to continue negotiating with Moscow. But this negotiation must not end in a compromise consecrating a flagrant inequality. If Europeans and Americans show that they are capable of establishing a common stand in the matter of Euromissiles, a hope for detente is permitted. The combination of a desire for Western defense and an evolution (that emerged from the Polish resistance) among the satellites of the USSR may lead the Kremlin to reflect. At present, I do not see any better hope for peace.

10,042
CSO: 3100/796

FACTIONS, CHARTS OF LEFTIST GROUPS PUBLISHED

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 30 May 81 pp 1, 8

[Article by Bedir Seferoglu: "28 Extremist Left Organizations Identified"]

[Text] When the security organizations, in a series of operations undertaken since 12 September, began capturing first the militants, then the leaders, of underground organizations, the existence of factions whose names had never been heard before emerged.

Security forces, which have largely dismantled the terrorist organizations, have identified factions which had been carrying out clandestine actions for a long time.

Twenty-eight extremist left-wing factions which were active in the big cities were exposed.

All current factions have been identified.

According to Security's determinations, the extremist left-wing factions all derived from the Turkish People's Liberation Army, known as the "TPLA." This organization later split into the TRWPP (Turkish Revolutionary Worker Peasant Party) and the TPLP-F (Turkish People's Liberation Party-Front).

With time, the factions divided among themselves and ended up with 28 secret organizations.

Those factions among the secret organizations which conducted the most and bloodiest operations were DEV-SOL [Revolutionary Left] and "Partisan Road." Security authorities pointed out that they had arrested the leadership and militant ranks of these two organizations and said that only the Partisan Road leader Sarp Kuray had fled the country.

All the actions of the organizations whose names were known but about which information could not be obtained prior to 12 September have also been identified.


Authorities said that in addition to DEV-SOL, the organization named DEV-YOL [Revolutionary Road] also carried out bloody actions. According to information provided by security forces, none of DEV-SOL's and DEV-YOL's professional,

experienced militants are left. Because their sources of arms are exhausted also, these organizations attempt "last ditch" actions with inexperienced militants using explosives, but these militants are soon captured also.

28 Factions

The 28 factions uncovered are:


1. TPLP-F-Urgency
2. TRWPP - Turkish Revolutionary Worker Peasant Party
3. TCP - Turkish Communist Party
4. TPLP-F-Turkish People's Party Front-Revolutionary Left
5. TRCP - Turkish Revolutionary Communist Party
6. TCPU - Turkish Communist Party Union
7. TCP-PYA - Turkish Communist Party Progressive Youth Association
8. TPLP-Front Road
9. TRCU - Turkish Revolutionary Communists Union
10. TPLP-F-Liberation
11. TPLP-F-Warriors
12. TCP-ML-TWPLA [Turkish Communist Party-Marxist-Leninist-Turkish Worker Peasant Liberation Army]
13. PU - Peoples Unity
14. TPCP - Turkish Proletarian Communist Party
15. TCP-WV - Turkish Communist Party-Worker's Voice
16. TPLP-F-MLAPU - Turkish People's Liberation Party Front-Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda Union
17. RR - Revolutionary Road
18. L - Liberation
19. PR - People's Road
20. UA - United for Action
21. RF - Revolutionary Fighters
22. TPLP-F-PRV - Turkish People's Liberation Party-Front-People's Revolutionary Vanguard
23. UR - Unity Road
24. T P-F Partisan Road
25. AL - Activist Left
26. TPLP-F (CS) - Turkish People's Liberation Party-Front Road Revolutionary Sympathizers Cayan Sympathizers
27. TPLP-F-P - Turkish People's Liberation Party-Front Platform
28. TCP-Unity



[Chart 1.] Other organization resulting from split in TPLA was TPLP/F, i.e., Turkish People's Liberation Party Front. This organization gave birth to most factions. The TPLP/F, led by Mahir Cayan, was parent of organizations such DEV-SOL and DEV-YOL, the factions which conducted the bloodiest actions. The TPLP/F also was parent of "TPLP/F Urgency," known as the "Urgencers."

Key:


- | | |
|------------------------------------|--|
| 1. TPLP-F | 11. Ankara Group |
| 2. TPLP-F(ML), People's Road | 12. TPLP-F Warriors |
| 3. Revolutionary People's Road | 13. TPLP-F Revolutionary Sympathizers |
| Maoist - AEP [expansion | Union |
| unknown] | 14. TPLP-F Federation of Revolutionary |
| 4. People's Road, Maoist | Youth Associations |
| Became legal TWPP | 15. Revolutionary Road |
| 5. Publications | 16. Third Road |
| 6. TPLP-F PASS [expansion unknown] | 17. Revolutionary Left |
| 7. TPLP-F Abroad | 18. TPLP-F Vanguard, Partisan |
| 8. MLAPU | 19. TPLP-F Liberation |
| 9. Izmir Group | 20. Publications |
| 10. United for Action | |



[Chart 2.] Almost all extremist left-wing organizations originated in the "Turkish People's Liberation Army," known as the TPLA. The TPLA first divided into groups within itself.

Key:

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1. TPLA | 8. TRCU |
| 2. TPLA, Teslim Tore Group | 9. TPLA [other expansions unknown] |
| Union for Struggle, Pro-Soviet | 10. Associations: Aksaray LIS-DER [expansion unknown], Istanbul Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Union, Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Federation, UmranİYE Culture Association, Kartal Revolutionary Workers Association |
| 3. [expansions unknown] | 11. Publications |
| 4. Publications | 12. Isik Group |
| 5. TPLA [other expansions unknown] | 13. Publications |
| 6. TRCU, Maoist - AEP [expansion unknown] | 14. TPLA, Omer Kral Group, Pro-Soviet |
| 7. [expansion unknown] | |



[Chart 3.] The TPLA originally split into two major factions. The first was the Turkish Revolutionary Worker Peasant Party, known as the TRWPP. Over time, the TRWPP, headed by Ibrahim Kaypakkaya, itself split. Factions with oft-heard names such as TCP/ML, TWPLA and Partisan originated in this organization.

Key:

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1. TRWPP | 10. TCP(ML) Abroad |
| 2. Liquidators | 11. TCP(ML), Maoist - AEP [expansion unknown], Partisan TRWPP |
| 3. Liquidators (TCP/ML) | 12. TCP(ML), Cliquists |
| 4. TCP(ML), Peoples Union, Maoist - AEP [expansion unknown] | 13. Publication |
| 5. TCP(ML), Revolutionary People's Road | 14. TCP(ML), Partisan |
| 6. Publication | 15. TCP(ML), Revolutionary Partisan, Aegean Region |
| 7. TCP(ML), People's Union | 16. TWPP (Legal Party) |
| 8. Publications | |
| 9. April-May 1976 | |

UNFAVORABLE ECONOMIC CONDITIONS FORESEEN THROUGH 1981

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 26 Jun 81 p 13

/Report by Ss, datelined Kiel, 25 Jun 81: "The Downswing Will Get Even Worse"/

/Text/ Unemployment in excess of 1.5 million until the end of this year and 1.7 million in the average of 1982 is part of the somber prospects sketched for the FRG by the Kiel Institute for World Economy. The institute does not foresee any possibility of the current stabilization of demand and output leading to a new upswing in the second half of this year. Instead it expects that the downswing will accelerate once more all over the world. The outstanding factor here is the stringent restrictions imposed--against all expectations--by the banks of issue (beginning with the United States). Moreover financial politics are in such confusion that they tend to increase the effects of the business cycle in most countries. At the same time the institute points out that devaluation-related inflation pushes have caused the monetary authorities in Western Europe to follow the restrictive line of the American bank of issue.

As regards the FRG, the institute accuses the Bundesbank of having, by its exclusive orientation to foreign trade developments, sown confusion in monetary policies. Monetary policy is geared to the prevention of the encroachment of import price rises on domestic price developments, but has succeeded only in burdening business by restricting liquidity and imposing high interest rates. The effect of high interest rates on investment is underestimated. We must therefore expect the decline of real equipment investments to become even more acute in the course of 1981.

The Institute for World Economy foresees that the growth in the money supply will slow down in 1981. It again asks that monetary policy be oriented to the development of note circulation and sight deposits (M-1), which grows only slightly at this time, not to the money supply in the wider sense (M-3). According to the institute a relaxation of monetary restrictions cannot be expected until the end of 1981. The institute also sees the danger of an unduly expansive monetary policy being pursued in 1982 if inflation should decline--the price index is not expected to rise above 3 percent--and the trend be toward an improvement in the current account. The current account deficit for 1982 is not expected to exceed DM20 billion.

The institute says quite explicitly that the 1981 investment climate was adversely affected by the result of wage negotiations. Standard wage raises are likely to result in a hefty rise in unit costs. The distribution ratio will probably show a

decided shift to the detriment of profits. On the other hand the forecast says that record unemployment and declining rates of inflation in 1982 may result in sensibly lower wage rises; even a nominal wages pause is within the realm of possibility.

However, it appears doubtful whether it will be possible to achieve a rise in the gross national product for the average of the year in view of the belated reorientation of economic and wages policies (the institute advocates purposeful changes in social security but opposes increases in rates of contribution for unemployment insurance or a manpower levy). From the standpoint of the present situation a revival of output may be expected only in the second half of 1982.

11698
CSO: 3103/346

PROBLEMS FACING COAL, STEEL INDUSTRIES

Bonn DIE WELT in German 15 Jun 81 p 15

/Article by Erwin Walther: "The New Crisis in the Steel Industry Further Damages the Region"/

/Text/ "If a steel crisis should occur, Dortmund will not be the only victim. That is why we need new efforts in the Ruhr region." This is how Kurt Biedenkopf, CDU fraction chairman in North Rhine-Westphalia's provincial assembly, characterized the situation in the region between Wesel in the west and Hamm in the east. Residing on 4,432 square kilometers in the preeminent European industrial region between the rivers Ruhr, Emscher and Lippe are more than 5.4 million people. That represents a population density of 1,220 per square kilometer, and at 2,162 residents per square kilometer density is considerably greater yet in the 11 major cities.

This industrial region is one of the oldest and most important in the world. Currently it produces 80 percent of German hard coal (some 69 million tons of the 86 million tons mined in 1979) and 60 percent of German steel (25 million tons of the 46 million tons processed in 1979). Unfortunately these two pillars have begun to totter in the German "center of energy."

For 20 years coal was involved in severe competition with other sources of cheap primary energy--oil and natural gas. Not only did it survive this contest, it has lately become more competitive. Now the steel industry is getting to be the major problem in the region.

The mining crisis began in 1957. From that time on hard coal mining on the Ruhr declined from 124 million tons to barely 70 million tons; manpower was reduced from about 400,000 to only 144,000. At the present time only 31 mines are in operation, compared with 140 24 years ago.

The crisis in the iron and steel works of the region, on the other hand, dates back only 7 years, and the most extensive manpower reductions are still to come. The Dortmund steel corporation Hoesch/Estel was the first to announce massive layoffs, and it does not seem as if the Bochum Krupp Stahl AG will be able to avoid them either, though the Iranian stockholder (25.1 percent of the capital stock) has taken some of the sting out of the supervisory board's initial and radical layoff plans.

And yet the steel problem must be tackled and settled. It is only secondarily a home made problem--see Hoesch, for example. Disregarding excess capacities in Europe, the primary difficulty for the German industry is presented by the subsidy mentality prevailing in neighboring European countries.

Europe's most modern steel plants on the Ruhr still produce more than 20 percent of the EEC's raw steel. In 1979, for example, raw steel output in the Ruhr region amounted to 25.3 million tons, some 10 percent more than France's entire steel production.

"New efforts in the Ruhr region," as called for by Professor Biedenkopf, are therefore urgently required to safeguard the future. "For a considerable time preparations have been made to give the economy a more diversified base and thereby make it more impervious to crises" says an informational leaflet of the Ruhr Regional Municipal Federation in Essen. The Federal Government and the Land have made available emergency funds for this restructuring.

The region's large cities are to receive several hundred millions of D-mark as per a plan to aid the Ruhr. Two years ago, at the Ruhr Regional Conference, the Land approved the spending of about DM6 billion until 1985; the Federal Government is contributing the fifth billion. Key points of the program are housing construction, environmental conservation, the replacement of old power plants, model projects for the improvement of the environment and the establishment of a Ruhr regional fund for real property. However, the prospects of success for this plan are still subject to much dissension.

The present economic situation in the region does not arouse much optimism. "The Ruhr's economy is on the downswing, a lot remains to be done until we get back to the upswing," was the tenor of the joint business report issued by the Ruhr regional Chamber of Industry and Commerce in spring 1981. Though at DM114.2 billion the turnovers of Ruhr region industries last year were 6.9 percent above the 1979 results, this actually means a slight drop in real terms in view of the 7.5 percent rise in industrial producer prices. The decline continued at the beginning of 1981, so that in fact a nominal minus must be expected.

11698
CSO: 3103/346

EXPORTS COULD YIELD SLIGHT DECLINE IN 1981 DEFICIT

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 25 Jun 81 p 11

(Analysis of German foreign trade by Lothar Julitz)

(Text) The latest news about foreign trade is designed to restore some optimism. Since last fall the receipt of orders from abroad has visibly revived. The new demand push, benefiting primarily the manufacturers of investment goods, has already begun to affect deliveries.

It would be unwise, though, quickly to forget the just surmounted weakness of foreign trade--especially because here and there people already talk of an imminent "export boom" with large export surpluses. In fact, despite the further weakening of the D-mark's foreign value in the first months of this year, figures in red ink have turned up in the first quarter not only in the current account but also--and for the first time since the mid-1960's--in the balance of trade, although exports rose by comparison with the last quarter of 1980. Generally the reasons given for this unusual deficit are (and quite correctly) the persistent and drastic inflation of oil prices and the overall rise in import prices due to the devaluation of the D-mark. At the same time much more is involved, in particular a dangerous loss in competitiveness: Consequent upon the increasing domestic cost push many German products have become too expensive for the world markets.

In the first 4 months of this year total export deliveries in real terms were still 1 percent and imports almost 5 percent lower than in the period January-April 1980. In terms of value most of our principal customers have purchased considerably fewer German goods (see table). The only countries substantially to raise their imports from the FRG were oil producing countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Nigeria; also South Africa, interested mainly in motor vehicles, machines, chemical and engineering products, increased its purchases by 50 percent in 1 year, and Greece bought German goods to the tune of DM1.1 billion, nearly a third more than in the first 3 months of 1980.

As regards imports, Japan has further advanced among suppliers from the industrial countries. It has overtaken Austria and Switzerland by an almost 50 percent rise since the previous year and now occupies third place among our 20 most important suppliers. Britain is evidently and increasingly benefiting from its North Sea oil; by virtue of a 22 percent rise the British have moved up to fifth place. Among the traditional oil suppliers Saudi Arabia advanced six places, raising the value of its

deliveries by nearly 80 percent; that country is thus the only one which--after deduction of the price increase--supplied a greater volume of oil.

The 20 Largest Customers (exports fob)

| 1981 Export Values ¹⁾ | First Quarter 1980 | | First Quarter 1981 | |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------|-------------|--------------------|-------------|
| | Million DM | Percentage | Million DM | Percentage |
| 1. France (1) | 11,933 | 13.4 | 12,420 | 13.6 |
| 2. Netherlands (2) | 8,962 | 10.1 | 8,228 | 9.0 |
| 3. Italy (3) | 7,614 | 8.6 | 7,964 | 8.7 |
| 4. Benelux (4) | 7,538 | 8.5 | 7,015 | 7.7 |
| 5. Britain (5) | 6,026 | 6.8 | 5,650 | 6.2 |
| 6. United States (6) | 5,669 | 6.4 | 5,454 | 6.0 |
| 7. Switzerland (7) | 5,124 | 5.8 | 5,055 | 5.5 |
| 8. Austria (8) | 4,689 | 5.3 | 4,607 | 5.1 |
| 9. Sweden (9) | 2,669 | 3.0 | 2,463 | 2.7 |
| 10. Soviet Union (10) | 1,849 | 2.1 | 1,925 | 2.1 |
| 11. Denmark (11) | 1,837 | 2.1 | 1,709 | 1.9 |
| 12. Spain (12) | 1,313 | 1.5 | 1,356 | 1.5 |
| 13. South Africa (17) | 880 | 1.0 | 1,322 | 1.4 |
| 14. Yugoslavia (13) | 1,229 | 1.4 | 1,261 | 1.4 |
| 15. Saudi Arabia (16) | 1,003 | 1.1 | 1,250 | 1.4 |
| 16. Norway (15) | 1,019 | 1.1 | 1,130 | 1.2 |
| 17. Japan (14) | 1,019 | 1.1 | 1,093 | 1.2 |
| 18. Greece (18) | 823 | 0.9 | 1,075 | 1.2 |
| 19. Iraq (20) | 749 | 0.8 | 1,063 | 1.2 |
| 20. Nigeria (-) | 750 | 0.9 | 878 | 1.0 |
| 20 Largest Customers | 72,697 | 81.9 | 72,918 | 80.0 |

1) In parentheses: last year's ranking

By now German importers need to pay an average of more than DM600 per ton of crude, some DM200 more than a year ago. Though the volume of oil imported in the first 4 months of 1981 was only some 28 million tons, 6 million tons less than in the same period of 1980, the oil account increased by just over DM2 billion to almost DM17 billion due to rising prices and D-mark devaluation. At present the German economy spends roughly 6 times more on crude and refined oil than before the first oil crisis; this expense weighs heavily on the total import account, amounting to nearly 20 percent now, that is more than after the first oil crisis.

Most experts agree that oil and other raw material imports can be cut to only a limited extent if bottlenecks in the economy are to be avoided. Not least by reason of regulative considerations the federal economics minister's latest attempt to achieve a kind of self-restrictive agreement on car deliveries with Japan has met

with a good deal of skepticism. Any hopes for reducing the current account deficit must ride on satisfactory export levels. Here the devaluation now in effect for more than a year has obviously improved the competitiveness of German products. According to Bundesbank computations the D-mark's external value declined by around 20 percent against the pound sterling since the end of 1979, by about 25 percent against the U.S. dollar and by almost a third against the yen.

The 20 Largest Suppliers (imports cif)

| 1981 Import Values ¹⁾ | First Quarter 1980 | | First Quarter 1981 | |
|----------------------------------|--------------------|-------------|--------------------|-------------|
| | Million DM | Percentage | Million DM | Percentage |
| 1. Netherlands (1) | 10,025 | 11.6 | 11,091 | 12.1 |
| 2. France (2) | 9,504 | 11.0 | 10,355 | 11.3 |
| 3. Italy (3) | 6,798 | 7.9 | 6,670 | 7.3 |
| 4. United States (4) | 6,701 | 7.8 | 7,065 | 7.7 |
| 5. Britain (6) | 5,421 | 6.3 | 6,594 | 7.2 |
| 6. Benelux (5) | 6,395 | 7.4 | 5,990 | 6.6 |
| 7. Japan (9) | 2,181 | 2.5 | 3,235 | 3.5 |
| 8. Switzerland (7) | 3,193 | 3.7 | 2,961 | 3.2 |
| 9. Saudi Arabia (15) | 1,526 | 1.8 | 2,699 | 3.0 |
| 10. Austria (8) | 2,416 | 2.8 | 2,457 | 2.7 |
| 11. Libya (10) | 2,113 | 2.5 | 2,311 | 2.5 |
| 12. Norway (11) | 2,000 | 2.3 | 2,302 | 2.5 |
| 13. Sweden (13) | 1,792 | 2.1 | 1,971 | 2.2 |
| 14. Soviet Union (14) | 1,706 | 2.0 | 1,850 | 2.0 |
| 15. Algeria (19) | 1,071 | 1.2 | 1,450 | 1.6 |
| 16. Denmark (16) | 1,464 | 1.7 | 1,375 | 1.5 |
| 17. Nigeria (18) | 1,118 | 1.3 | 1,308 | 1.4 |
| 18. Spain (17) | 1,128 | 1.3 | 1,090 | 1.2 |
| 19. Hong Kong (20) | 872 | 1.0 | 952 | 1.0 |
| 20. South Africa (-) | 812 | 0.9 | 818 | 0.9 |
| 20 Largest Suppliers | 68,236 | 79.2 | 76,544 | 81.5 |

1) In parentheses: Last year's ranking

Source: Federal Office for Statistics

Demand also revived because inventory reductions abroad have evidently slowed down, while the oil producing countries and some developing countries, in particular Argentina and Mexico, have begun to place more orders. All in all orders from abroad in the first quarter (in real terms and seasonally adjusted) have shown twice the rise of the last 3 months of 1980. All major sectors have benefited, the investment and consumer goods industries above the average; orders for the machine construction and electrical engineering industries rose particularly sharply. In the basic and production goods sectors the lively influx of orders has continued in the chemical and the iron and steel industries.

However, due to the strains of the first few months, the forecasts for exports in 1981 as a whole assume no more than stagnation in real terms (1980: plus 4.2 percent), and a real decline in imports of about 3 percent (1980: plus 2.2 percent). According to the same forecasts the (nominal) balance of trade surplus will be about DM13 billion (DM9 billion). As far as the current account is concerned, this means an only slightly reduced deficit by comparison with 1980 (minus DM29.1 billion).

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SAARLAND BY-ELECTION: FDP, CDU GAIN, SPD LOSS

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 16 Jun 81 p 4

(Report by FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU correspondent Gunter Hollenstein)

(Text) Last Sunday's local elections in Mettlach (Saarland) resulted in a 5.1 percent loss for the SPD which obtained 37.8 percent of the vote, a 1.7 percent gain for the CDU which, at 30.5 percent achieved a bit better than the absolute majority, and a 3.4 percent rise for the FDP giving it a total of 11.7 percent. The by-elections were necessary because, 2 years ago at the general elections, the last seat was disposed of by lot following a dead heat. As a result the CDU had obtained the absolute majority. After long and acrimonious legal disputes the higher administrative court in Saarlouis declared the elections invalid.

In the Saarland the parties showing in Mettlach was considered a test of strength. To be noted is the fact that, in absolute terms, the SPD lost 17 percent of the vote, while the FDP gained 33 percent and doubled its share of seats. It is quite obvious that, as at the Hessen local elections, many SPD voters stayed home. Saarland SPD Land chairman Oskar Lafontaine held federal policies responsible for his party's poor showing. According to him the FDP was the beneficiary of unsatisfactory CDU Land government and the negative federal trend for the SPD. Premier Werner Zeyer (CDU) felt that the elections confirmed the propriety of his Land policies. FDP chairman Werner Klumpp spoke of a "mirror of the general political trend" and ascribed the Liberals good showing to the FDP's appropriate Land policies.

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JUSOS PURSUE AGREEMENTS WITH 'GREENS'

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFUTER ALLGEMEINE in German 25 Jun 81 p 4

Report by ptn, datelined Wiesbaden, 24 Jun 81: "Jusos: The Watchword Is Follow-up"

[Text] Despite last week's clear vote of confidence for Hessen Premier Boerner at the special SPD Land congress in Wiesbaden, conflicts about important government projects persist. Last Wednesday the Jusos [Young Socialists] announced that they would make even greater efforts to publicize their political ideas "inside and outside the SPD," regardless of their rejection by the party congress. Referring to the resolutions adopted by the subdistrict party congresses which had opposed Land government policies, Juso chairman Schueren called upon his political followers: "The watchword is follow-up."

Only 1 day after the special party congress Kassel Social Democrats did just that. On Monday they joined with the "Greens"--against the votes of the CDU and FDP--and, in the city assembly, resolved to go to court against the construction of a reprocessing facility in Diemelstadt/Volkmarshausen and, "so as to have the proper backing for their legal steps," to ask for an expert environmental impact report regarding the effects of such a facility on Kassel residents. Both the CDU and the FDP considered these steps inappropriate and superfluous. They pointed out that expert opinions would be obtained and objections heard within the scope of the examination and licensing procedure if the proposed location in north Hessen would in fact turn out to be the final choice; an expert opinion ordered by Kassel city council would be a waste of money and could not possibly be justified in view of the city's financial situation.

Chief Burgomaster Eichel, confirmed Monday last in his office by the votes of the SPD and the Greens, attempted to justify the expert opinion and legal steps against the nuclear facility by citing the resolution adopted in early June by the new red-green alliance. At that time the SPD and the Greens in the city assembly opposed a reprocessing facility and the further expansion of nuclear energy. In Eichel's opinion that resolution logically leads to the present decision. However, a large majority of both the north Hessen district party congress in Baunatal and the special party congress rejected the attitude of the Kassel Social Democrats.

In Wiesbaden last Wednesday the Hessen CDU commented on the instant Kassel resolution by saying that the Kassel SPD had "unmistakably shown" thereby the "political weight" it ascribes to last Sunday's vote at the "emergency party congress," which had explicitly recommended a study of the issues involved in the construction of a reprocessing facility. "The staging of a Sunday majority is obviously one thing, the political reality in the SPD's everyday party life another," remarked the CDU. It charged that the SPD was united only in clinging to power.

NEW POSTS FOR CORTIER, VOIGT REINFORCE SPD ARMS POSITION

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFUTTER ALLGEMEINE in German 27 Jun 81 p 4

Report by C.G., datelined Bonn, 26 Jun 81: "Cortier Dohnanyi's Successor in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs"

[Text] At a coalition talk Federal Chancellor Schmidt and Federal Foreign Minister Genscher agreed to appoint SPD Bundestag deputy Cortier the successor to State Minister Dohnanyi at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Dohnanyi had moved to Hamburg to become that city's senior burgomaster. His leave taking and Cortier's swearing in as State Minister will take place on Monday next in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Originally Cortier had been expected to leave for a 4-day visit to Moscow on just that day, accompanying SPD chairman Brandt. Brandt's trip follows a personal invitation by Soviet state and party chief Brezhnev, and Cortier was to go along as chairman of the SPD Bundestag fraction's foreign affairs and defense committee. In addition to a meeting between Brandt and Cortier on the one side and Brezhnev on the other, Cortier had planned meetings with Soviet West and defense politicians such as Arbatov, Palin and Zagladin. Subsequent to his new appointment Cortier decided to cancel his trip.

He made that decision due to the shift in accents which would have been set to the talks with the Soviet leadership by virtue of Cortier's new office. Neither the Federal Chancellor nor Genscher are currently interested in appearing to give official blessing to Brandt's visit by having a cabinet member go with him. In view of the limitation of Brandt's role during his visit to that of party chairman and of the uncertainty surrounding the preparations for Brezhnev's visit to the Federal Republic--supposed to take place later this year--it seemed undesirable to both Brandt and Genscher for the visit to be upgraded. Admittedly Soviet Ambassador Semyonov informed the Federal Chancellor that Brezhnev still intends to visit Bonn this year; a firm date would be agreed after the summer recess. Bonn, though, considers this another postponement. Initially Brezhnev was to come in the spring, later early autumn was mentioned because the Western summit in Ottawa (July) was to be awaited. Now the visit is only to be discussed at the time when it should have been over--in the fall. The dispatch of the State Minister at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to Moscow at the present time, which features many uncertainties, would have created a new situation for both parties, Bonn as well as Moscow, and nobody is prepared to countenance this in a hurry.

New State Minister Cörterier is known to be a staunch supporter of the Atlantic Alliance and to maintain close contacts with members of the U.S. Congress. As chairman of the SPD Bundestag fraction's foreign affairs and defense committee as well as member of many Atlantic organizations he had specialized in defense matters, including the NATO dual resolution.

In the course of the SPD's internal rearmament debate Cörterier championed Schmidt's and Apel's proposals, although the Bundestag opposition considers that he did occasionally make tactical/verbal concessions to the party left. Following Cörterier's move to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs the chairmanship of the SPD fraction committee is vacant. The vacancy is most likely to be filled by SPD left winger Carsten Voigt. In the view of the fraction majority this shows a lack of experienced advocates of the government's defense policy within the faction. It is expected, though, that in his capacity as committee chairman Voigt will not oppose Schmidt's policy, particularly because in recent months Voigt--while expressing differences of opinion with government rearmament policies--did eventually approve the dual resolution. The faction generally considers it desirable for Voigt in his new post to return to the government fold at least some of the leftist members, though they may still differ from Schmidt's line with respect to shades of motivation and method. Right wing faction member Herterich is likely to replace Voigt as the SPD fraction's spokesman on foreign affairs, so that a certain balance between the two wings may be expected. Nevertheless Schmidt's intimates among the Bundestag faction are rather unhappy about the consequences of Dohnanyi's move to Hamburg, since Cörterier had been a most reliable supporter of the Chancellor.

The coalition talk between Schmidt and Genscher proceeded without drama, though some tension had occurred before the meeting. Genscher had indicated his wish to appoint a FDP politician to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Earlier Genscher had thought of FDP faction defense spokesman Moellemann. However, the latter's out-of-line remarks on tanks for Saudi Arabia and Bonn's anxieties concerning Poland ruled him out of consideration (last Tuesday Moellemann attracted considerable opposition in the FDP faction). Subsequently Genscher indicated preference for the FDP faction's foreign affairs spokesman Schaefer.

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SDP CONGRESS MEETS AS LEADERS STRING NEW MOBILIZATION

Helsinki SUOMEN KUVALEHTI in Finnish 12 Jun 81 pp 27-29

[Article by Antti Blafield: "Social Democrats Facing Problem of Alternatives"]

[Text] Social Democrats admit that there is a limit to economic growth.

Social Democrats demand decentralised government, more human politics.

Lapp gets into Political Bureau, SDP's [Social Democratic Party] top organization. Number of women members quintuples.

SDP about to enter a new age.

"The worker movement has from the start been a power majority movement. This movement has been regarded as having evolved gradually, in conjunction with proletarianization and impoverishment.

"But it has evolved otherwise. There is no longer a power majority, unified in terms of its interests and opposing which is a class of exploiters clearly small in number. The class struggle is no longer at issue; it is rather a conflict between two factions, a large number of oppositions and struggles."

SDP party secretary Eriki Liikanen, who was just elected, has concentrated his party's problem. Economic growth is no longer taken for granted. At least the class struggle no longer breaks out in the ranks of the Social Democrats. The party has firmly committed itself to the handling of national affairs as a sort of government caretaker who, when slamming the door shut on positions to be adopted, has to ponder over what is possible, what is important, what is ideal in terms of gaining a realistic sounding board.

This guru with the pragmatic approach is Mauno Koivisto, the growth of whose popularity is both an advantage and a problem to the SDP. In committing itself to Mauno Koivisto, the individual, the party simultaneously commits its government caretaker to the very practical and mundane role of master of possibilities. Revolution and socialism are echoes of the past to which there is from time to time good reason to return in order to raise one's spirits.

Pirkko Tyolajarvi also spoke of pragmatism: "In my opinion, one of the essential points of departure in measuring one's own values and transforming them from hopes

into the possible is international development, for better or for worse. This, for example, ties our economic thinking closely to free trade, the Western market-economy countries."

Symbols of Change

Both Pirkko Tyolajarvi and Mauno Koivisto are in different ways symbols of change, new kinds of politicians who have rejected the political liturgy, who dare to have their own opinions, who dare to say so. This too is why they have become symbols of party protest movements, youth, women and development areas, even though they at the same time represent a line which young people, women and representatives of development areas feel uncomfortable with.

Pirkko Tyolajarvi asserted: "To maintain the present level of employment, with the measures now available, we need a GNP with an average growth rate of 3 percent. It is well to remember this when we demand that economic growth be abandoned. Thus there is something wrong with our equations."

Mauno Koivisto said about aid for development: "I have tried to point out that a nation assigns its real resources abroad only when it has a surplus balance of trade. If we provide aid for development and the nation is at the same time in debt, within the nation it means that the burden is shifted to future generations and is, under the best of circumstances, to be paid for in future years."

On hearing this, the leader of the party's left-wing youth and principal of the Metalworkers Union's vocational school in Marikka, Jukka Gustafsson, lashed out: "I have promised the chief editor of KANSAN LEHTI that a mob of people will leave Teisko in Tampere for the old Tampere town square blowing the horns of their cars with their dancing legs nimble and ready and roses in their hands and a victory for mankind in mind when the time comes for Finland's Manu [Koivisto] to head the nation. That will be the season for roses, regardless of the time of year."

Young people were also enthusiastically selling Manu shirts. Three years ago they still had Marx on their shirt fronts. Koivisto's portrait was sold for the benefit of the Turku Vartiouvuori Movement at a bottom price of 2,000 marks.

"Do We Want a Plastic Finland?"

Parliamentary representative Liisa Jaakonsaari from Oulu brought up party controversy, the desire for change and the problem of a new line: "Do we want Finland to turn into a plastic Finland with a selfish standard of living or into an ecologically balanced society in which, aside from adequate job security, a clean and healthy environment to live in, meaningful work, rich human relations and real opportunities for the individual to influence decision-making at all levels are also valued? A meaningful life for people requires more than what has been proposed in the position papers presented to this party congress. Social democracy is not a state enterprise which distributes money and services to people. Social democracy is more and more a movement that liberates people."

"What will the fascism of growth bring with it," Jaakonsaari asked.

What Jaakkonsaari, the women and the young people had to say does not fit in with the basic Social Democrat's way of thinking. Traditionally, the party has acted in just the opposite way. It has distributed money and services. It has based its activities on growth.

In Pori too, this was the unshakable position of most of the party congress delegates. Basic Social Democrats listened to the protests patiently, but it is always hard to understand a different language.

The strongest support for the party leadership came from the strongest southern districts: Kymi, Uusimaa, Häme, Satakunta. The total of 164 delegates from these districts accounted for almost half of the congress delegates.

The Swedish Workers Union, Helsinki, Varsinais-Suomi and Lapland as well as the young people, about 40 of whom were in the conference room, laid emphasis on ecology, aid for development and the quality of people's lives.

Women's March

"The women's march into the room was really important. It shook up petrified attitudes," Varsinais-Suomi delegation head Armas Lahoniity said. "The ideological debate has just begun. We are still too cautious."

"In 1975 in Jyväskylä they approved even radical positions, but they were introduced from above. In 1976 in Espoo they were not discussed. Here the pressure comes from above," Jukka Gustafsson asserted.

The women's march into the room and the song Marianne Ikonen, who lost out in the race for party secretary, sang for Eriki Liikonen also produced a sympathetic response for the young people's candidate for the Party Bureau, Ann-Marie Seligson. She came within 18 votes of winning the seat in the Party Bureau.

Seligson represents the opposition in its purest form: "Growth thinking in terms of formulas must be rejected. What is at issue is the quality of life, the redistribution of resources. We must ask what the price of growth will be."

"Women's role has been on display before. As long as men's and women's representation is not in balance, personal issues will also always be sex issues. Once it is, we can advance to a new, fair standard. Women have a lot to offer; they have experienced social reality differently than men have."

"It Is a Question of How One Looks at Things"

"I feel that it is not a question of sex, rather a different way of looking at things," Pirkko Tyolajarvi opined. "What has happened to other sparks of hope must not happen to women. Out of pure sexual solidarity this is how I feel."

"The growth ideology can only be given up gradually. For example, national income and expenditure budget items would have to be redistributed. Income tax for business firms would have to be abandoned but certain subsidies which do not belong to the domain of a market economy would also have to be eliminated."

"The party congress decisions are certainly firm enough. We ought to look into the backgrounds of issues, a new kind of preparation, and more attention should be paid to the implementation of decisions. Problems too are more dependent on the way they are worked out. At the present time the machinery is choking on itself. The party ought to have an idea bank in which opinions should produce runners, after which we would agree on which of them is important and follow through on them. The most dangerous of all are the idealists, who don't think realistically. They don't understand the indispensability of practical realization."

Empty Bench

There was lengthy and earnest discussion at the party congress. But what significance the current of the discussion had is another matter. For example, while the party was busy approving four international policy resolutions, 26 delegates were sitting in the conference room merrily chatting among themselves.

The Party Bureau's bench was more often empty than full. Provincial delegates poured out their hearts in prepared speeches to the half-empty room and empty party leaders' chairs. There were two exceptions: Pirkko Tyolajarvi and Veikko Helle sat there persistently listening to what was weighing down the rank and file. Koivisto too was one of the most conscientious congress participants in the room.

Then too, the contents of these speeches written with blood, sweat and tears were so sharply pruned that it was no longer possible to make any sense of them at all.

Aimo Massinen, the chief editor of the TURUN PAIVALEHTI, presented a specially established Retu-Sali award to the best speaker at the party congress. At least in Pori the number of competitors who took the matter seriously shrank to just a few.

The congress discussed things best when the delegates voted or applauded. Or failed to applaud, for example, Ulf Sundqvist, when he turned his seat over to Liikanen. There were neither roses nor thanks. It was only the party's honorary members who corrected the situation by giving Sundqvist a single rose, and Veikko Helle snatched that from Sundqvist's seat to give it to Jenny Matinaho on her 80th birthday.

The situation was corrected before the Party Bureau elections, in which there was no longer any room for Sundqvist. Sundqvist received thanks and a bunch of roses from Sorsa. In his thank-you speech, Sundqvist replied to the criticism that had been raised against him: "I could have handled a lot of things differently than I have. It is certainly altogether appropriate for such a somewhat technocratic reform socialist to leave the party secretary's post."

The SDP is entering a new age, one marked by the growth crisis. Pressures from the party rank and file, that were still controllable in Pori and which have been in part concealed, will bubble and foam in a much worse way when the party meets next time in Lahti in 1984, the year George Orwell described in such gloomy tones.

BRIEFS

NIGERIAN VISAS CUT-The French Embassy in Nigeria no longer issues long-term visiting visas and resident permits to Nigerians travelling to France, an official of the embassy told the News Agency of Nigeria (NAN) in Lagos on Tuesday. The official said that under a new guideline on the issuance of visas which came into effect last week, Nigerian travelling to France could only be issued with transit visas for not more than three days. According to the official, request for French visas entitling Nigerians to more than a three-day stay must be backed up with acceptable letters from the applicants "employers or some other proofs that the applicants had a genuine business to transact in France. The official stated that the new measure was a reaction to an incident a fortnight ago, in which a Nigerian was caught with "huge consignment" of Indian hemp" at Charles De Gaulle Airport in Paris. Following the incident, the official said, French authorities had tightened security measures against Nigerian and other African travelling to France. A NAN correspondent who visited the embassy reported that a number of prospective Nigerian travellers to France who could not satisfactorily explain why they wanted visas for five to 50 days were given transit visas for only three-days. (NAN) [Text] [Kaduna NEW NIGERIAN in English 26 Jun 81 p 14]

CSO: 4700/160

NEW NATIONAL GUARD COMMANDER

Nicosia CYPRUS MAIL in English 25 Jun 81 p 1

[Text] The new National Guard Commander Gen. Nicolaos Papanagiotou yesterday took up his duties.

Earlier he was received by President Kyriatou and by the Minister of the Interior and Defence.

General Papanagiotou took over from the Deputy Commander G. Arinas who has been the Acting Commander after the retirement of Gen. Kominos.

The new Commander hails from Larisa in Greece. He graduated at the Law School of Athens University and the Military Academy from which he emerged as an Infantry Officer.

He took part in the 1947/49 military operations and is a graduate of the War and National Defence Schools.

General Papanagiotou had served in Cyprus in 1967 to 1969 but was removed from active service by the Athens military junta because of his opposition to the colonels. He returned to active service when Constantine Karamanlis returned to Greece after the collapse of the military regime.

He was posted to the National Defence General Staff and became Commander of the 11th Division in Macedonia and Thrace and of the Second Corps in Northern Greece. He retired two years ago.

Before his posting as National Guard Commander he was recalled to active service.

He is married to a Cypriot and he has one daughter.

CSO: 4600/54

BRIEFS

AIR SPACE GUARDING TIGHTENED--On Wednesday a provision came into force according to which border control of all flights will be under the jurisdiction of a special air border guard squadron, which is part of the Border Guard Service. To the squadron will belong the air squadron which has been based in Turku, as well as a number of air groups within the various units of the Border Guard Service, and within the Coast Guard units in various parts of the country. The squadron at Turku has both planes and helicopters, while the land border will mainly be guarded only by helicopters. Planes have also been based in Rovaniemi, and later they too will be based in Helsinki. The Frontier Guard will get an additional three MI-8 helicopters from the Soviet Union in the fall, which will be mostly used by the sea rescue service in the Turku Archipelago. [Text] [Helsinki HUVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 2 Jul 81 p 16]

SOVIET-MADE ASSAULT VEHICLES DELIVERED--The Armored Brigade has received new equipment in the form of Soviet-made BMP armored assault vehicles. This armored vehicle, which first came into use in the early 1970's, is light and rapid and has off-road capabilities. According to a headquarters spokesman, it is intended soon for use with the light-armored infantry. The vehicle is amphibious, and it is designed so that the infantry complement it carries can use its weapons from the vehicle without even dismounting. The shape of the BMP makes it a difficult target for defensive weapons. The weight is around 12 tons, and the speed is over 50 kilometers per hour. Its armament consists of a 73-mm cannon and machineguns. There is equipment for operating in darkness. It has a crew of three, and the vehicle can carry eight men. In Finland, the BMP's will go first to the Armored Brigade at Parola for training use. [Text] [Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 4 Jul 81 p 7]

CSO: 3107/115

CRIME RATE REPORTED LOW

Nicosia CYPRUS MAIL in English 20 Jun 81 p 1

[Text] Crime in Cyprus continues to be at a low level because Cypriots in their overwhelming majority are honest and law-abiding, the Chief of Police Mr Savvas Antoniou told a press conference yesterday.

A scientific examination of the criminal statistical data, he said, presents a picture of a steady disinclination to commit crime in Cyprus and an increasing percentage of its detection which is mainly due to the positive cooperation of the public on the one hand and the improvement of the means of investigation on the other.

Mr Antoniou put crime detection at around 55 per cent which, he said, is regarded as quite satisfactory.

In spite of these encouraging conclusions, Mr Antoniou said, the police are seriously concerned about the danger of the importation of organised crime into Cyprus aimed at Cypriots and foreigners for personal, political and economic motives and "the clearing of their accounts" on Cyprus soil.

For the prevention of crime the Cyprus police are taking all precautionary measures and cooperates with Interpol and other national allied foreign organisations. An example of such cooperation has recently gone [as received] that the majority of the ancient Cyprus icons and the mosaic depicting the Leda and the Swan.

Referring to road accidents Mr Antoniou expressed his regret that the majority of the people have not yet acquired a driving conscience and disregard basic regulations thus contributing to the increase of road accidents.

Narcotics

With regard to narcotics the Chief of Police said that it is a very serious problem for many countries but it is fortunately a minor problem in Cyprus. The public in general detests narcotics, he said, and the isolated cases of their use among young people are followed closely by the police.

The use of Cyprus by foreigners as a transit for drugs trafficking is a serious problem and new measures have recently been taken for dealing with the problem with the cooperation of Interpol.

Answering questions Mr Antoniou said that the government is considering to amend the law regarding the use of flipper machines by young people. The use of such machines is now prohibited for boys under 16 unless they are accompanied by their parents.

To be a successful candidate for the police force, he said, one should be educated and of a very good character. Members of the police force, he said, should not belong to political parties.

From the beginning of the new year, said Mr Antoniou the weekly working hours for the police will be reduced from 48 to 42. Work above this limit will be considered as overtime.

CSO: 4600/53

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